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Abstract: The Upper Midwest is poised for a major investment boom in wind-powered electricity
generation. Public policy currently favors corporate ownership structures for new investment in this
field, but when wind development takes place under the aegis of an external corporate ownership
group the local economic participation will generally be limited to a minor role. This study attempts to
quantify the regional value-added and employment consequences of local- versus outside-ownership of
wind-powered electricity generation. We employ a realistic pro forma model of a “flip” structure -i.e. a local equity “community wind” group partnered with an external tax-motivated equity group -for a modestly sized (9.9 MW) wind farm, using recent vendor-certified capital costs combined with
additional financial estimates from industry participants, assuming a class four wind resource. The
present value of the residuals (after tax profits) as well as the other O&M expenditures are annuitized
and entered into a Minnesota state-level input-output model. We find that, respectively, under
pessimistic and optimistic parameter assumptions in the community-wind group’s pro forma, the
impact on state-level value added is 3.1 and 4.5 times larger than the impact would be under an
external ownership structure. The impact on employment is respectively 2.5 and 3.5 times larger than
that generated by an external ownership structure.

* The author thanks John Ihle, Dan Juhl, and Lowell Rasmussen for generously sharing data and experience. Research
assistance was provided by Dugan Flanders and Thompson Clifford.

Ownership and Regional Economic Impact: The Case of Wind Development in Minnesota
I. Introduction
With RES legislation growing in popularity across the U.S., current economics favor an
immense build-out of wind over the course of the next decade.1 A great deal of analysis has focused on
the location of best wind resources, and upon the technology and infrastructure (transmission capacity,
balancing generation, and possible storage media) that will be necessary to incorporate significant
quantities of wind power into the generation mix.2
In practice, public policy has been an influential if not decisive factor in shaping both the
volume of wind development and also the specific business organizational form that this development
assumes.3 Current policy, for example, favors firms with sufficiently large tax liabilities and with an
established capital market presence. Smaller pools of local capital, organized as partnerships,
cooperatives, municipals, non-profits, or LLCs, have a more difficult time taking advantage of the full
range of existing public policy incentives. A recent survey found that only 4% of U.S. wind capacity is
locally owned, in stark contrast, for example, to the northern European figures of 83% and 45% in
Denmark and Germany, respectively.4
When wind development takes place under the aegis of an external corporate ownership group,
the local economic participation will generally be limited to a minor role in construction (e.g. cement
contracting), enhanced property tax collections, and a continuing stream of land-lease payments (often
in the range of $3K - $4K per year). Compared to corporate projects, some research has suggested that
locally-owned “community wind” projects will likely spend more locally on attorney fees, electrician
services, and other construction-related outlays.5 The largest effect, however, may be the residuals of
the project, which would enter the local economy directly as income streams.6
1 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted Renewable Electricity Standards, while five more have
adopted voluntary targets. (http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm, last accessed June
21, 2010). See the [California] Renewable Electricity Transmission Initiative (2008) for a relative ranking of levelized
renewable generation costs. NREL researchers recently estimated that in order to reach a national goal of 20% of
electricity production from wind power by the year 2030, annual installations of new capacity will have to grow by 2018
to over 16 gigawatts per year, which was roughly the entire installed capacity in the U.S., as of 2008 (Laxon, Hand, &
Blair, 2008).
2 One comprehensive example is the U.S. Department of Energy report 20% Windpower by 2030 (U.S. D.O.E., 2008).
3 Kildegaard (2007). Bolinger and Wiser (2004).
4 Windustry: http://www.windustry.com/communitywind (last accessed June 21, 2010). In Minnesota, the figure is 25%.
5 Grover (2005), Northwest Economic Associate (2003).
6 Lantz and Tegen (2008), Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006).

Much of the best on-shore wind resource in the U.S. is located in the central Great Plains.7 It is
an open question as to whether or not the local communities there will embrace and promote the
anticipated wind development, or whether local resistance will prove too strong -- as for example it has
with respect to on-shore wind development in England. In the latter case, extensive research has
established that successful local resistance is strongly related to an unacceptable balance between local
costs and local benefits, despite a national policy that strongly promotes wind development.8 In the
socially conservative region of the U.S. Great Plains, it seems likely that political support for wind
development traces more to the economic potential that it represents than to environmental sensibilities
per se. A public policy that aims to encourage wind development in general might yet prove to be
undermined by tax incentives and other policy provisions that strongly discourage local ownership.
Since ownership structure is an outcome significantly influenced by public policy, and
potentially a determinant of community acceptance in this region poised for rapid wind development,
this study investigates the consequences of ownership structure for local economies. Specifically, we
conduct our analysis of Minnesota, where community wind is an established force in state policy and
the policy developments relating to grid connection and tariffs are reasonably far along.
A few fairly modest attempts have been made to analyze the differential economic development
consequences of locally-owned wind development.9 This article pursues this question with some
important enhancements: i) the cost data are actual and up-to-date, vendor-certified costs as of late
2009; ii) the power prices are consistent with power purchase agreements recently approved by the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission; iii) a fully-articulated financing model is included, complete
with a tax equity partner and with supplementary bank financing; iv) the local ownership residuals (as
well as the various O&M expenses) are inserted into a state-level input-output model to capture the
effects of the project on the regional economy.
II. Ownership Structures
Capturing the federal tax incentives is a key element of project design, comprising as these do
somewhere in the range of 30-40% of a project’s overall revenue stream.10 Bolinger et al. (2004) and
7 U.S. Department of Energy windmaps: http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_maps.asp (last accessed June 21,
2010).
8 Toke (2005); Devine-Wright (2005); Rogers et al. (2008); Hain et al. (2006)
9

Galluzzo (2005), Grover (2005), Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006), Lantz and Tegen (2008),

10 The production tax credit (PTC) currently stands at $21/MWH, while the double declining depreciation allowance
allows full write-down of the project’s capital costs in just five years.

Kildegaard and Myers-Kuykindall (2006) describe various ownership structures for local capital to
participate in wind development, the most successful of which in fact capture the majority of the
federal incentives. Harper et al. (2007) survey and evaluate a variety of financing structures for larger
projects, again with the capture of federal incentives being a principal objective.
One common structure involves a tax equity partner with sufficient tax appetite to consume the
entire federal incentive. Frequently an ownership “flip” is arranged at a pre-determined moment, for
example upon the expiration of the production tax credit (after 10 years), or after the tax equity partner
has achieved a pre-negotiated after-tax internal rate of return on its original investment. After the flip
takes place, majority ownership rights to the remaining cash flow devolve back to the local equity
group.
In the analysis that follows we formally model an ownership structure in which an equity
partner captures most (99%) of the tax incentives (depreciation, production tax credits, interest
deductions) over the first 10 years of the project. For years 11-20 the ownership shares flip to 5% for
the tax equity investor and 95% for the local investor.11 The project’s total debt financing is calibrated
to enable the tax-motivated equity partner to achieve a targeted after-tax internal rate of return (IRR) on
its 99% equity stake. The term on the debt is chosen to maintain debt service coverage requirements at
acceptable levels. Since the flow of benefits to the local equity group is extremely uneven (see below)
over the project’s 20-year lifespan, we calculate and annuitize the net present value of these benefits.12
The local ownership residuals of the project are subsequently entered into a state-wide input-output
model, wherein the ultimate economic impacts are estimated and compared with projects employing
exclusively non-local equity
III. Pro Forma Modeling
A 20-year pro forma model was created for a 9.9 MW project (6 x 1.65), incorporating the
actual capital, development, and O&M costs from a current project at the University of Minnesota.
These costs are presented in Tables 1-2.
We construct two scenarios (optimistic and pessimistic), with parameters reported in Table 3.
The key differences include, respectively: 1) interest rates on bank debt; 2) requisite after-tax internal

11 5% is the minimum IRS requirement for the tax partner’s continued participation. See Harper et al. (2007), esp. pp.6970.
12 For example: if the after-tax net present value comes to $5 million, at a discount rate of 5%, this is equivalent to an 20year annuity stream of $401,212.94 annually. In this case, we would use the annuity payment as a key input to the statelevel input-output model.

rates of return; 3) discount rates applied to the ultimate net cash flows. These differences in free
parameters lead to some key differences in endogenous variables, including: 1) levels of overall debt
financing in the project; 2) capital contributions on the part of the tax equity partner; 3) debt
maturities.13 A screen-shot of the pro forma cash flow sheet (years 1-7) is presented as Table 4.
Figure 1 shows the annual after-tax, net profit share of the project accruing to the local
ownership group. As with most flips, the local equity partner returns are much larger late than early.14
Both scenarios share a common trajectory. Year 11 the local investor is assigned 95% of the project’s
operating cash (and attendant profit taxes), but the remaining years of debt service (two and five years,
in optimistic and pessimistic respectively) ensure that the corresponding net cash distribution is much
lower. After the debt is retired (year 12 or 15), the project’s net cash equals its operating cash. With the
ownership shares now flipped, distributions to the local investor rise much higher for the duration of
the project.
Figure 2 focuses on the first decade, where it can be seen that the returns to the local investor
are essentially identical across scenarios.15 Since the numbers are in current, non-discounted dollars,
one might visualize the benefits net of the opportunity cost of capital, by annuitizing (over 20 years) the
initial local equity investment. For example, in the optimistic scenario, approximately $144,000 is
initially invested; at a discount rate of 5% this equates to 20 annual payments of roughly $11,500.
Figure 2 also graphs the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios after subtracting the opportunity cost of
capital (O.C.C.). Over the first decade of the horizon, this correction appears to make a rather
significant difference; however, as Figure 1 illustrates, in the 11th year the returns turn highly positive.
After year 12 (optimistic) or 15 (pessimistic), the $11,500 correction is nearly two orders of magnitude
below the benefit stream.
Figure 3 illustrates the uncorrected difference between net benefits in the two scenarios. The
returns are essentially identical outside of years 11-15. For years 11-12, the optimistic scenario is
impacted by assumption of 95% equity share (raising the tax liability), as well as full responsibility for
the two remaining years of debt service. The 11th year shock to the pessimistic scenario is mitigated by
13 Debt maturities are set to ensure that the debt service coverage ratios never fall below 140%, and that the total local
return never falls negative in any given year.
14 In practice, there are various methods employed to advance the return to the local investors. These may include for
example an expense item through which the tax-motivated partner pays a “management fee” to the local partners.
Alternatively, an upfront development fee may be paid to the local investors. Each of these strategies has specific legal
and tax consequences, incorporation of which would add more heat than light to the analysis here. Presumably, financial
instruments may be employed to shift the timing of cash flows in a straightforward manner.
15 A significant portion of the early returns take the form of tax benefits, resulting from the favorable depreciation
allowance (“double declining balances method”). We assume that the local investors have sufficient tax appetite to make
full use of the depreciation and production tax credits accruing to their 1% of the project.

the extended term of the loan, which lowers debt service on an annual basis. In year 13, the optimistic
scenario is free and clear of debt obligations, and the net returns rise accordingly.
An alternative measure of the return on local equity is simply to calculate the internal rate of
return (IRR) on a rolling basis. Figure 4 illustrates the paths for each scenario, plotting the IRRs for
years 2-20. The IRRs reach zero (indicating full recuperation of the initial outlay) after 5 and 5.5 years,
for pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, respectively. The IRRs reach the respective discount rates (6%
and 5% respectively) between years 7 and 8 -- indicating a break-even after-tax net present value of
zero. The IRRs grow sharply after year 10 (the flip year), and again after year 12 (optimistic) or 15
(pessimistic), at which point the debt is fully retired. At the project’s conclusion, IRRs have reached
32% (pessimistic) and 37% (optimistic).
In present value terms, discounting future after-tax net proceeds from the project, the two
scenario yields are presented in Figure 5.16 Under the pessimistic scenario, the after-tax present value of
the project comes to $3.876m.; the optimistic scenario comes to $7.027m. For a better sense of the
average annual revenue, Figure 6 annuitizes the totals from Figure 5 for a 20-year lifespan of the
project, at the previously-given after-tax rates of returns. The pessimistic scenario produces the
equivalent of a 20-year annuity payment of $338k, while the optimistic scenario produces a 20-year
annuity payment of $563k.
In addition to the two scenarios described above, we also model a third (“non-local”),
corresponding to the impacts of wind development under external corporate ownership. For the nonlocal scenario we assume identical O&M streams, however the pre-multiplier income stimulus is
limited to the after-tax land-lease payments, since the project’s residuals accrue externally to the region.
The next section considers the state-wide economic impact, when these direct value-added
effects are added to O&M spending streams, and subsequently allowed to operate through realistic
local spending multipliers.
IV. Input-Output Analysis
In this section we use the outputs of the pro forma analysis as inputs to an economic impact
analysis. Specifically, we plug the data from the pro forma analysis into a state-level (Minnesota)

16 Since the annuity has a present value exactly equal to the local equity stake, subtracting the annuity payment from the
gross, and then discounting the cash flow is identical to simply calculating the discounted present value of the gross cash
flow, net of the initial equity investment.

input-output analysis,17 using data and software from the Minnesota IMPLAN Group.18
There are two distinct categories of impacts, having to do in the first instance with capital
expenditures and construction, and in the second with on-going operational expenditures and local recirculation of profits from the project. Our analysis is exclusively concerned with the latter, which are
the lasting effects.
Since both the net revenue stream accruing to local ownership and the expenditure stream
associated with on-going O&M are variable, the local economic impact will differ from year to year. In
principle these streams could be smoothed over the 20-year project life-span, either through contractual
terms between the partners or through financial arrangements entirely separate from the partnership.
The specific timing of impacts is of less interest here than the average magnitude of these impacts, so
we proceed by effectively annuitizing both the expenditure and the net revenue streams, and using
these as a point of departure for the input-output model. Figure 7 presents the annuitized values of the
O&M expenditure streams under each scenario,19 including the breakdown according to expenditure
category. These expenditure categories are subsequently mapped to the industry/commodity categories
of the IMPLAN database, as reported in Table 5.
Table 6 reports results from simulating the impact of each scenario on the two most obvious
indicators: value added, and employment. Figures 8 and 9 present the findings graphically.20 In terms of
value added (including wages, profits, rents and taxes), the optimistic and pessimistic local ownership
scenarios add an annual flow of $1.533m. and $1.05m., respectively, as compared with the outside
ownership contribution of $344k. In terms of employment, the optimistic and pessimistic local
ownership scenarios contributed an annual equivalent of 12.4 and 8.8 jobs, as compared with the
17 Miller and Blair (2009) is comprehensive reference for input-output modeling, including full development of social
accounting matrices.
18 IMPLAN Professional® Version 2.0. Our model uses the full social account matrix (SAM) specification, including all
household institutions of final demand, along with state and local government (both education and non-education
spending). The regional purchase coefficients are estimated econometrically by IMPLAN, and we have specified that the
model choose “average” (as opposed to “max” or “first”) values for the RPCs. All direct increments to household
spending are assigned to the SAM institution “Households $100-$150k.” As per Table 5, land leases are discounted by
the tax rates from Table 3, before incrementing final demand. Project residuals, however, are already calculated after-tax,
hence may be added without tax discounting to final demand.
19 Note that the only difference between the scenarios with respect to O&M expenses is the discount rate applied to future
cash flows. The pessimistic scenario models a higher discount rate, which on the expense side actually lowers the
present value of future payments.
20 The IMPLAN model calculates three layers of effects: direct, indirect, and induced. The expenditure stimulus impacts
the local economy directly through the purchase of local goods and services, and indirectly through the increased
demand for intermediate inputs (necessary to meet this change in final demand). The re-spending of the income
generated via direct and indirect effects induces another set of impacts, until the stimulus leaks out of the local economy
via imports, taxes, and savings. For a detailed description see IMPLAN (2004).

outside ownership contribution of 3.5.
V. Conclusion:
This study attempts to quantify the regional value added and employment consequences of
local- versus outside-ownership of wind-powered electricity generation. We have employed a standard
“flip” model for developing a modestly sized wind park in collaboration with a tax-motivated partner.
In collaboration with industry participants we have modeled optimistic and pessimistic assumptions
about financing terms, in an attempt to realistically bracket the range of possible outcomes. The net
present value of the residuals (accruing to the local ownership group) of this model, along with the ongoing O&M expenditures, were subsequently inserted into an input-output model for the State of
Minnesota, in order to quantify the direct and indirect consequences of higher local incomes and
spending.
The analysis concludes that local ownership yields regional value added between 3.1 times
(pessimistic) and 4.5 times (optimistic) higher than a project developed by non-local ownership. The
employment impacts are, respectively, 2.5 and 3.5 times greater in the two local-ownership scenarios,
relative to the non-local ownership baseline.
One over-arching cautionary note must be sounded: the “flip” model of local ownership
depends fundamentally on the existence of tax appetite on the part of the tax-equity partner, which in
turn depends directly on corporate profits. The pool of available tax-equity financing, moving forward,
will depend critically on the strength of the recovery from the 2008-2009 recession.
These findings are not in and of themselves a rationale for “protectionism”. The key point is
that -- as many have pointed out in the literature on wind development -- publicly provided incentives
are in most cases not only influential but actually decisive factors in determining the quantity and
nature (including ownership structure) of wind power development. Regional policy-makers have
direct influence over the tariffs for different categories of wind development as well as the nonfinancial terms of access to the grid. In the interest of regional development (as well as clean energy)
they may wish to consider how to use those instruments to counterbalance a federal policy strongly
biased against local ownership.
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Tables
Table 1: Upfront costs
Capital

Per Turbine
-x-x-x$2,739,000

9.9 MW Project
-x-x-x$16,436,000

Gen. conditions mob/demob.
Foundation, conduit & transfer pad
Crane, rigging, erection labor, turbine electrical labor
Electrical wiring from generator to transformer
FAA obstruction light
Earthwork
Access road and exterior improvements
Total Construction Costs

$37,000
$153,000
$250,000
$167,000
$3,000
$15,000
$60,000
$685,000

$222,000
$918,000
$1,500,000
$1,002,000
$18,000
$90,000
$360,000
$4,110,000

Transformer
Substation/interconnection
Total Utility Construction Costs

$20,000
$17,500
$37,500

$120,000
$105,000
$225,000

Engineering/Project Planning
Geotechnical Exploration
Permitting
Independent Testing & Inspection
Interconnection studies
Legal & Finance
Total Misc. Development Costs

$140,000
$5,000
$8,000
$7,500
$100,000
$25,000
$285,500

$840,000
$30,000
$48,000
$45,000
$600,000
$150,000
$1,713,000

(a)

Turbines and towers
Land Transport (a)
Capitalized warranty (a)

Total Capital Costs
Construction

Utility Construction Costs

Misc. Development Costs

Total Investment
TOTAL $3,747,000
(a)
Itemized costs redacted to comply with vendor’s contractual non-disclosure agreement.

Table 2: Operating expenses
Operating Expenses
Land Leases
*
Service Agreement Renewal
*
Liability & Force Majeure Insurance
*
Equipment and Loss of Profit Insurance
*
Power Use
Accounting/Auditing*
Property Tax
Total Expenses, Pre-inflation (Years 1-5)
Total Expenses, Pre-inflation (years 6-20)
*
3% annual inflation rate modeled

Per Turbine
$3,500
$25,000
$3,000
$11,000
$1,250
$833
$6,426
$15,010
$51,010

Total
$21,000
$150,000
$18,000
$66,000
$7,500
$5,000
$38,557
$90,057
$306,057

Years
1-20
6-20
1-20
6-20
1-20
1-20
1-20
1-5
6-20

$22,484,000

Table 3: Scenario assumptions
Scenario
Parameter:

Optimistic

Pessimistic

interest rate on bank debt

8%

10%

loan term (years)

12

15

8.5%

10%

discount rate

5%

6%

debt financing

36%

38%

equity financing

64%

62%

$14.24m. (99%)

$13.89m. (99%)

$144k. (1%)

$140k. (1%)

after-tax IRR (tax investor)

tax partner equity
local investor equity

Parameter values constant across scenarios:
project lifespan

20 years

tax equity partner marginal
tax rate(a)

40%

local investor marginal tax
rate(a)

35%

production tax credit (PTC)

.021/kwh

depreciation method
ownership “flip” after year

double declining balances (5 years)
10

pre- and post-flip shares:
tax equity partner
local investor

.99/.05
.01/.95

power purchase agreement(b)

.068/kwh

turbine efficiency(c)

39%

turbine availability(c)

95%

electricity sales

$2,184,924

(a) Includes state and federal taxes.
(b) Based on power purchase agreements recently approved by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
(c) Based on an average of four years of performance data for the Vestas V82 turbine installed on the campus of the
University of Minnesota West Central Research and Outreach Center in Morris, Minnesota. This installation
represents a class 4 wind resource, with average windspeeds at 50 meters between 7.0 and 7.5 meters per second.
Much of the Great Plains, including western Minnesota, the Dakotas, Nebraska, and parts of Iowa, are categorized
as class 4 or higher wind zones (U.S.D.O.E, 1986).

Table 4: Pro Forma screenshot (first seven years; optimistic scenario)
YEAR
Revenues
kwh/yr
PPA Rate

0

1

2

32,131,242
32,131,242
$0.06800
$0.06800
$2,184,924 $2,184,924

To ta l Re ve n u e s

3
32,131,242
$0.06800
$2,184,924

4
32,131,242
$0.06800
$2,184,924

5
32,131,242
$0.06800
$2,184,924

6
32,131,242
$0.06800
$2,184,924

7
32,131,242
$0.06800
$2,184,924

Expenses
$90,057
$90,972
$91,915
$92,886
$93,886
$94,915
$335,867
$2,094,867 $2,093,952 $2,093,010 $2,092,039 $2,091,039 $2,090,009 $1,849,057
($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075) ($1,074,075)
-1.95
-1.95
-1.95
-1.95
-1.95
-1.95
-1.72
$1,020,792 $1,019,877 $1,018,935 $1,017,964 $1,016,964 $1,015,934
$774,982

To ta l Expe n s e s
O pe ra ti n g C as h
De bt S e rvi ce

Coverage Ratio
Net Cash
interest
outstanding debt

8094312.72

Taxable Income
Operating Cash
Interest
Depreciation
TI
Investor Return
99% Investor
Tax Rate
Tax Savings
Tax Credits
Tot.taxSavings
99% net cash
Total Eq.Rtn
Local return
1% Investor
Tax Rate
Tax Savings
Tax Credits
Tot. Tax Savings
1% Net Cash
Total local Rt.

$647,545
$7,667,783

$613,423
$7,207,130

$576,570
$6,709,626

$536,770
$6,172,321

$493,786
$5,592,032

$447,363
$4,965,319

$397,226
$4,288,470

2094866.966 2093951.966 2093009.516 2092038.792 2091038.947 2090009.106 1849057.259
-647545.018 -613422.622 -576570.435 -536770.072 -493785.681 -447362.538 -397225.544
-8993680.8 -5396208.48 -3237725.088 -2428293.816 -2428293.816
-7546358.852 -3915679.136 -1721286.007 -873025.096 -831040.55 1642646.568 1451831.715

$(14,245,990)

$(143,899)

-7470895.263 -3876522.345 -1704073.147
40%
40%
40%
$2,988,358
$1,550,609
$681,629
$668,009
$674,689
$681,435
$3,656,367
$2,225,298
$1,363,065
$1,010,584
$1,009,678
$1,008,745
$4,666,951 $3,234,976 $2,371,810

$75,464
0.35
$26,412
$6,748
$33,160
$10,208
$43,368

$39,157
0.35
$13,705
$6,815
$20,520
$10,199
$30,719

$17,213
0.35
$6,025
$6,883
$12,908
$10,189
$23,097

-864294.845
40%
$345,718
$688,250
$1,033,968
$1,007,784
$2,041,752

-822730.145
40%
$329,092
$695,132
$1,024,224
$1,006,794
$2,031,019

1626220.102
40%
($650,488)
$702,084
$51,596
$1,005,775
$1,057,370

1437313.398
40%
($574,925)
$709,105
$134,179
$767,232
$901,412

$8,730
0.35
$3,056
$6,952
$10,008
$10,180
$20,187

$8,310
0.35
$2,909
$7,022
$9,930
$10,170
$20,100

($16,426)
0.35
($5,749)
$7,092
$1,342
$10,159
$11,502

($14,518)
0.35
($5,081)
$7,163
$2,081
$7,750
$9,831

Table 5: O&M expenditures mapped to IMPLAN commodities/institutions
Pro Forma Expense
IMPLAN Commodity (Institution)

(a)

Land Leases

Households $100-$150K (a) [disposable income]

Service Agreement Renewal

365 --- Commercial and Industrial Machinery Maintenance &
Repair

Liability and Force Majeure
Insurance

357 -- Insurance Carriers

Equipment and Loss of Profit
Insurance

357 -- Insurance Carriers

Power Use

31 -- Electric Power

Accounting/Auditing

368 -- Accounting/Tax Preparation/Bookkeeping

Property Tax

12001 -- State & Local Government Non-Education (50%)
12002 -- State & Local Government Education (50%)

Net Return to Local Investors

Households $100-$150K (b) [disposable income]

Land leases are discounted by the assumed tax rate (see Table 3) before being added as an increment to final demand.
Net returns to local investors are already calculated after tax, and therefore need not be discounted before incrementing
final demand.
(b)

Table 6: Comparative Economic Impacts
Project’s Direct Contribution
Variable:

Annuitized
Disposable
Scenario:
Income

Input-Output Model “Multiplier” Effects

Project
Property
Tax
Payments

Land Lease
Income
(After-Tax)

Direct

Indirect

Induced

Total

(Scenario)
/ (NonLocal
Scenario)
Ratio

In-State PESSIMISTIC
Value Added

$338,000

$38,557

$13,650

$249,517

$101,300

$309,865 $1,050,889

3.1

... OPTIMISTIC

$563,000

$38,557

$13,650

$348,737

$138,288

$431,328 $1,533,560

4.5

... NON-LOCAL

$0

$38,557

$13,650

$106,092

$49,892

$135,866

$344,057

1.0

In-State PESSIMISTIC
Employment

-

-

-

3.2

1.2

4.4

8.8

2.5

... OPTIMISTIC

-

-

-

4.7

1.6

6.1

12.4

3.5

... NON-LOCAL

-

-

-

1.0

0.6

1.9

3.5

1.0
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Absolute Differences in Annual After-Tax Returns
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